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FIRST AMENDMENT
Does the Child Online Protection Act
Violate the First Amendment?
by Susanna Frederick Fischer
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 289-295. © 2004 American Bar Association.
ISSUE
Does the Child Online Protection
lAct (COPA) violate the First
Amendment to the United States
Constitution?
FACTS
This is the second round of argu-
ments before the Supreme Court,
on a second attempt at federal legis-
lation to protect children from sexu-
ally explicit material on the Internet
that is not obscene by adult stan-
dards. An earlier effort to achieve
the same goal, the Communications
Decency Act (CDA), enacted as Title
V of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, was struck down in 1997 by
the United States Supreme Court on
the basis that it violated the First
Amendment. Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844 (1997).
Proponents of such federal legisla-
tion did not give up after Reno v.
ACLU. On October 21, 1998,
Congress enacted a second statute,
COPA, which attempts to remedy
Ithe constitutional defects of the
CDA. COPA prohibits "knowingly
and with knowledge of the character
of the material, in interstate or for-
eign commerce by means of the
World Wide Web, mak[ing] any
communication for commercial pur-
poses that is available to any minor
and that includes any material that
is harmful to minors." 47 U.S.C. §
231(a)(1). Violations are subject to
civil and criminal sanctions, includ-
ing imprisonment up to six months,
criminal fines up to $50,000, and
civil penalties up to $50,000 per
violation. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1)-(3).
Anyone who intentionally violates
COPA may additionally be fined up
to $50,000 per day that a violation
exists. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(2).
COPA defines material that is
"harmful to minors" as material that
is "obscene" or that satisfies a
three-part test, namely, material
that:
(A) the average person, applying
contemporary community
standards, would find, taking
the material as a whole and
with respect to minors, is
designed to appeal to, or is
(Continued on Page 290)
ASHCROFT V AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION ET AL.
DOCKET No: 03-218
ARGUMENT DATE:
MARCH 2, 2004
FROM: THIRD CIRCUIT
289
Susanna Frederick Fischer is
an assistant professor of law at
the Catholic University of America
in Washington, D.C.;
fischer@law.edu
or 202-319-5568.
designed to pander to, the
prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or repre-
sents, in a manner patently
offensive with respect to
minors, an actual or simulated
sexual act or sexual contact,
an actual or simulated normal
or perverted sexual act, or a
lewd exhibition of the genitals
or post-pubescent female
breast; and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks seri-
ous literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value for minors.
47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6). "Minors" are
defined by COPA as persons under
the age of 17. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(7).
COPA contains a definition of
"commercial purposes," namely:
"A person shall be considered to
make a communication for commer-
cial purposes only if such person is
engaged in the business of making
such communications." 47 U.S.C.
§ 231(e)(2)(A). "Engaged in the
business" is defined to mean:
that the person who makes a
communication ... by means of
the World Wide Web, that
includes any material that is
harmful to minors, devotes
time, attention, or labor to
such activities, as a regular
course of such person's trade
or business, with the objective
of earning a profit as a result
of such activities (although it
is not necessary that the per-
son make a profit or that the
making or offering to make
such communications be the
person's sole or principal busi-
ness or source of income). A
person may be considered to
be engaged in the business of
making, by means of the World
Wide Web, communications for
commercial purposes that
include material that is harm-
ful to minors, only if the per-
son knowingly causes the
material that is harmful to
minors to be posted on the
World Wide Web or knowingly
solicits such material to be
posted on the World Wide
Web.
47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(B).
COPA provides for an affirmative
defense to prosecution when a
defendant "in good faith, has
restricted access by minors to
material that is harmful to minors"
by imposing a requirement to use
a credit card, debit account, adult
access code, or adult personal
information number, by accepting a
digital age verification certificate, or
by taking "any other reasonable
measures that are feasible under
available technology." 47 U.S.C.
§ 231(c)(1).
On the day after COPA's enactment,
the American Civil Liberties Union
and other free speech advocates and
online-content providers that post
sexually explicit content on the Web
(collectively, ACLU) filed suit in the
United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
making a facial challenge to COPA's
constitutionality and seeking to
enjoin the government from enforc-
ing it. After holding an extensive
evidentiary hearing, the district
court granted the plaintiffs' motion
for a preliminary injunction on the
basis that they were likely to suc-
ceed on the merits of their claim
that COPA was unconstitutional.
ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp.2d 473
(E.D. Pa. 1999).
The district court found that COPA
is a content-based regulation of
speech that was subject to strict
scrutiny analysis. Although the gov-
ernment had "a compelling interest"
in protecting minors from harmful
materials that were not obscene by
adult standards, it was not clear that
the government would meet its bur-
den at trial to show that COPA is
"narrowly tailored to achieve its
goal" and is "the least restrictive
means" to do so. 31 F. Supp.2d 495-
97. The plaintiffs had established a
likelihood of success on the merits
on the basis that COPA would undu-
ly burden speech that is constitu-
tionally protected for adults. In par-
ticular, it was likely that by imple-
menting age verification or credit
card screens, COPA might deter
adult users from accessing material
that was harmful to minors,
and might consequently chill
publications by Web publishers
who bore the costs of implementing
age-verification technologies. The
current technological impossibility
of restricting minors from accessing
chat rooms and discussion groups
other than by requiring screening
for all users would impose an undue
burden on speech that was constitu-
tionally protected for adults.
Moreover, the government was not
likely to satisfy its burden to prove
that COPA is the least restrictive
means to achieve its compelling
interest. The district court found
that the use of blocking and filtering
technologies, though imperfect,
would likely be "at least as success-
ful as COPA" and would impose a
lesser burden on constitutionally
protected speech. ACLU v. Reno, 31
F. Supp.2d 497.
The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit affirmed the
district court. ACLU v. Reno, 217
F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000). This deci-
sion was entirely based on a new
ground raised by the Third Circuit
at oral argument, and did not reach
any of the grounds relied on by the
district court. Taking issue with
COPA's "contemporary community
standards" test, the Third Circuit
found that this is unconstitutionally
overbroad in the context of the
World Wide Web. The Third Circuit
reasoned that since Web publishers
lacked the ability to control the geo-
graphic distribution of their publica-
tions, the "contemporary communi-
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ty standards" criterion would result
in every Web communication being
required to comply with the most
restrictive community's standards.
The United States Supreme Court
vacated the decision of the Third
Circuit and remanded for further
proceedings. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535
U.S. 564 (2002). A majority of the
Court held that COPA's incorpora-
tion of community standards in its
definition of "material that is harm-
ful to minors" does not, by itself,
cause the statute to be unconstitu-
tionally overbroad. In so holding,
the majority did not express a view
as to whether COPA is unconstitu-
tionally vague or likely to survive
strict scrutiny analysis. The Court
did not vacate the preliminary
injunction granted by the district
court, but remanded for considera-
tion of the other issues.
On remand, the Third Circuit once
again affirmed the district court's
grant of a preliminary injunction
against enforcement of COPA. ACLU
v. Asheroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir.
2003). The Third Circuit agreed
with the district court that COPA
fails the strict scrutiny test. It held
that although COPA addresses a
compelling governmental interest in
protecting minors from harmful
material online, some of its provi-
sions are not narrowly tailored to
serve that compelling interest and
do not provide the least restrictive
means of furthering that interest.
The Third Circuit pointed out the
following problems: (1) COPA's defi-
nition of "material that is harmful to
minors" is insufficiently narrowly
tailored because its requirement
that such material be treated "as a
whole" would not permit the consid-
eration of such material in context
as the First Amendment requires.
(2) COPA's definition of "minor"
does not make it clear to Web pub-
lishers which age of "minor" they
should take into account in deter-
mining whether online material on
their Web site would violate COPA.
This is so even accepting the gov-
ernment's proposed narrowing inter-
pretation of the term "minor" to
mean normal, older adolescents.
That interpretation conflicts with
the plain meaning of the statute.
(3) COPA's limitation to communi-
cations for "commercial purposes"
is also insufficiently narrowly
drawn, since it applies to a wider
range of Web publishers than the
commercial pornographers that
were COPA's real target. The Third
Circuit did not accept the govern-
ment's proposed narrowing con-
struction of this provision to cover
only communications that have a
substantial connection to the regu-
lar online marketing of material that
is harmful to minors. Even though
COPA's definition of "engaged in the
business" contains the phrase "regu-
lar course ... of trade or business,"
this is not sufficient narrow tailoring
because there could still be liability
for communications that were a tiny
fraction of a content provider's busi-
ness. (4) COPA's affirmative defens-
es unconstitutionally burden adult
access to constitutionally protected
content. COPA's screening require-
ments are likely to deter many
adults from accessing restricted
content due to privacy concerns.
(5) COPA is not the least restrictive
means to achieve its purpose since
filtering or blocking software may be
at least as effective in protecting
children from harmful online mater-
ial. Moreover, COPA is unconstitu-
tionally overbroad. Although the
"community standards" provision
does not by itself render COPA
overbroad, COPA is overbroad when
the community standards provision
is viewed together with COPA's
overly broad definitions of "material
harmful to minors" and "for com-
mercial purposes" as well as its
overly burdensome affirmative
defenses. The "radical surgery" that
would be required to rewrite the
statute to make it constitutional
would be a "serious invasion of the
legislative domain." ACLU v.
Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 271.
The government's petition for
rehearing was denied. On October
14, 2003, the Supreme Court grant-
ed the government's petition for
review of the Third Circuit's deci-
sion. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S.Ct.
399 (2003).
CASE ANALYSIS
The parties agree that COPA regu-
lates speech based on its content,
which is presumptively invalid
under the First Amendment and
subject to a strict scrutiny analysis.
To survive constitutional scrutiny,
COPA must be supported by a com-
pelling government interest, and it
also must be narrowly tailored and
the least restrictive means of fur-
thering that interest.
In the "real world" context of tradi-
tional media sold in physical space,
many states have laws regulating
the sale of materials that are harm-
ful to minors although not obscene
for adults. In Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968), the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality
of a New York criminal statute that
prohibited the sale to minors of
magazines that were obscene as to
minors, though not obscene for
adults. Since Ginsberg, many states
have enacted "blinder laws" that
regulate not only the sale of materi-
als that are harmful to minors but
also the display of such materials to
minors. A number of federal courts
of appeals and state courts have
ruled that such blinder laws are
constitutional. See, e.g., Crawford
v. Lungren, 96 F.3d 380 (9th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1117
(1997), American Booksellers Ass'n
v. Virginia, 882 F.2d 125 (4th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056
(Continued on Page 292)
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(1990), American Booksellers v.
Webb, 919 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 942
(1991), Davis-Kidd Booksellers, Inc.
v. McWherter, 866 S.W.2d 520
(Tenn. 1993).
The problem of regulating materials
disseminated in cyberspace that
are "harmful to minors" arose in
the mid-1990s after the Internet
became a widely used communica-
tions medium in the United States.
Congress first attempted to address
this problem by enacting the CDA
in 1996.
The CDA criminalized the "know-
ing" transmission of "obscene or
indecent" messages to any recipient
under 18 years of age (the "indecent
transmission provision") as well as
the "knowing" sending or displaying
to a person under 18 of any message
"that, in context, depicts or
describes, in terms patently offen-
sive as measured by contemporary
community standards, sexual or
excretory activities or organs" (the
,'patently offensive display provi-
sion"). 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a), 223(d)
(1996). The CDA contained two
affirmative defenses. One applied to
defendants who took reasonable and
effective actions to limit access by
minors to prohibited material. 47
U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(A) (1996). The
second applied to defendants who
restricted access to such material
through the use of certain specified
forms of age verification. 47 U.S.C.
§ 223(e)(5)(B) (1996).
Although, on a facial challenge to
the CDA's constitutionality, the
Court found in Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844, that the government had a
compelling interest in protecting
minors from indecent messages that
would not be obscene for adults, it
held that the "patently offensive dis-
play" and "indecent transmission"
provisions of the CDA were vague
and not narrowly tailored to further
that interest. Nor had the govern-
ment shown that the challenged
provisions of the CDA were the least
restrictive alternative available to
further that compelling interest.
Moreover, the Court found the CDA
to be unconstitutionally overbroad
because it applied to large amounts
of non-pornographic material with
serious educational or other value.
The Court found the CDA to be sig-
nificantly broader than the "harmful
to minors" statute found constitu-
tional in Ginsberg because (1) the
CDA was not limited to commercial
transactions; (2) the CDA, unlike
the Ginsberg statute, failed to con-
tain any exception for parents who
permitted their children to view the
prohibited material; (3) the CDA's
key terms, indecent and patently
offensive, were undefined and also
failed to exempt material that was of
serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value; (4) the CDA's defin-
ition of minors as those under 18
years of age would include many
first-year college students, unlike
the Ginsberg statute, which limited
minors to those under 17.
The CDA's affirmative defenses did
not amount to sufficiently narrow
tailoring to save the CDA from
unconstitutional overbreadth.
According to the district court's
findings of fact, existing technology
could not be used by the senders of
messages on the Internet to block
minors' access to harmful materials
while permitting adults to access
these, nor could it be used to verify
age in chat rooms, e-mail, "mail
exploders," or newsgroups.
Moreover, again relying on the dis-
trict court's findings of fact, the
Court noted that the adoption of
age-verification technology was not
economically feasible for most non-
commercial Web sites and even
some commercial Web sites. But
parents could effectively and rea-
sonably use user-based filtering and
blocking systems to block their chil-
dren from accessing harmful materi-
al online. In sum, the Court likened
the CDA to "burning the house to
roast the pig." Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 882. The CDAs unconstitution-
al restrictions on speech "threaten
to torch a large segment of the
Internet community." Id.
The government now argues that
COPA has remedied all of the con-
stitutional defects of the CDA. The
ACLU disagrees.
The government contends that
COPA is narrowly tailored to further
the compelling interest of protecting
children from harmful material on
the World Wide Web. In support of
this contention, the government
points out that COPA's scope is nar-
rower than the CDA since COPA
applies only to material on the
World Wide Web, for which age
screening is technologically feasible,
and excludes e-mail, newsgroups,
and chat rooms, for which age
screening technology is not effec-
tive. The government also contends
that the narrowing of COPA's scope
to communications "for commercial
purposes' rectifies the CDA's prob-
lem of an overly broad reach to
entities and individuals who might
not be able to afford age screening.
The government argues that COPA
should be interpreted narrowly to
apply only to persons or entities
that seek to profit from posting
harmful materials online as a regu-
lar course of their business.
Moreover, according to the govern-
ment, COPA resolves other constitu-
tional defects from which the CDA
suffered. By limiting its coverage
only to material that appeals to the
prurient interest of minors, is
patently offensive with respect to
minors, and lacks serious value for
minors, COPA cures the CDA's over-
ly broad application to material with
serious value for minors. Unlike the
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CDA, COPA contains a precise defi-
nition of what types of material may
be considered patently offensive.
Furthermore, COPA is modeled in
all essential respects on state harm-
ful-to-minors laws that have been
found to be consistent with the First
Amendment.
The government argues that the
Third Circuit's holding that COPA is
not narrowly tailored is erroneous in
several respects. First, contrary to
the holding of the Third Circuit,
COPA's "as a whole" language does
not require material to be viewed in
isolation, but in the context, at mini-
mum, of the entire Web site on
which such material is posted.
Secondly, the Third Circuit erred in
finding that COPXs definition of
minors does not make clear to Web
businesses the age of minors that
they must take into consideration.
According to the government, in
considering whether material lacks
''serious 
... value for minors" under
COPA, the term "minors" should be
interpreted consistently with the
state "blinder laws" on which COPA
is modeled. On this interpretation,
the term means the oldest category
of minors, that is, normal 16-year-
olds. Third, the Third Circuit erred
in ruling that COPA's commercial
purposes definition is not narrowly
tailored. COPA limits its scope to
businesses that seek to profit from
harmful material on a regular basis.
The government urges the Court to
reject the Third Circuit's suggestions
that COPA should exclude business-
es that seek to profit from harmful
material through the sale of advertis-
ing space rather than the harmful
material itself, and that it should also
limit its scope to businesses that post
harmful material as a principal part
of their business. The government
argues that to limit COPA in this way
would unduly compromise its com-
pelling interest in protecting children
from harmful materials.
Fourth, the government contends
that the Third Circuit erred in hold-
ing that COPA's affirmative defenses
unconstitutionally burden adult
access to harmful material when
such material can be obtained
through the use of an adult ID or
credit card. According to the gov-
ernment, these modest screening
requirements are reasonable and do
not give rise to privacy concerns
since COPA contains confidentiality
requirements for which violations
are subject to criminal penalties.
Fifth, the Third Circuit erroneously
held that filtering or blocking soft-
ware might be a less restrictive
means of achieving the govern-
ment's goals. Finally, the Third
Circuit erred in finding COPA sub-
stantially overbroad. It is not over-
broad for the same reasons that it is
narrowly tailored. The government
contends that it follows that COPA's
reliance on community standards
cannot not exacerbate any problem
of overbreadth, because there is no
such problem.
The ACLU argues in response
that COPA violates the First
Amendment's strict scrutiny
requirement, since the government
has not met its burden to establish
that COPA is narrowly tailored to
address the government's interest in
protecting children from harmful
material. Nor has the government
established that COPA is not uncon-
stitutionally overbroad. According
to the ACLU, COPA, like the CDA,
"burns the house to roast the pig"
by suppressing too much speech
that is constitutionally protected for
adults to send and receive.
Respondent's Brief at 25-26, 30. The
ACLU describes COPA as a "blud-
geon" that targets not just business-
es that sell content online but also
online businesses that provide infor-
mation without charge as long as
they seek to profit by the sale of
online advertising. Respondent's
Brief at 18-19. Contrary to the gov-
ernment's argument, COPA's defini-
tion of "commercial purposes" is
not narrowly tailored but applies to
a broad range of speakers on the
Web.
The ACLU contends that COPA is
unconstitutionally overbroad even
on the government's interpretation
that it excludes material with value
for older minors, excludes Web sites
that only occasionally publish mate-
rial that is harmful to minors, and
requires material to be assessed as
harmful to minors in the context of
an entire Web site. Even accepting
this narrowing construction (which
the ACLU argues is a completely
untenable interpretation), COPA
places a broad range of online
speech at risk of prosecution. Since
COPA contains no exclusion for
material with serious educational or
entertainment value, it threatens
online providers of sex education as
well as content providers that post
sexually explicit speech purely for
entertainment.
Moreover, the ACLU argues that the
government's proposed narrowing
interpretation is untenable on
COPA's plain meaning. The govern-
ment's narrowing construction of
COPA's definition of "minors" would
leave younger minors totally unpro-
tected and is thus inconsistent with
the statute's purpose. The govern-
ment's interpretation of COPA's
"commercial purposes" language to
exclude Web sites that only occa-
sionally post material that is harm-
ful to minors is inconsistent with
the plain language elsewhere in the
statute. Interpreting COPA to mean
that allegedly harmful material must
be evaluated in the context of an
entire Web site is not feasible or
practical, and does not take into
account the problem of large Web
sites with vast amounts of content
or links on Web sites to content
residing on different servers.
(Continued on Page 294)
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COPA's affirmative defenses consti-
tute undue burdens on content
providers by requiring them to risk
criminal prosecution or to imple-
ment costly technological screening
that would deter adults from access-
ing constitutionally protected
speech as a result of privacy con-
cerns. Given that the burden of
proof for COPA's affirmative defens-
es is on content providers, subject-
ing them to this Hobson's choice
will have a chilling effect on consti-
tutionally protected speech, espe-
cially when there is a risk of being
prosecuted according to the stan-
dards of the most conservative com-
munity. Moreover, COPA's affirma-
tive defenses will impose registra-
tion requirements on all users of
interactive fora such as Web-based
chat and discussion groups, even if
most of the material on the discus-
sion does not contain material that
was harmful to minors.
The ACLU argues that COPA would
be ineffective in accomplishing its
goal and that there are other less
restrictive means to accomplish it
than a threat of criminal sanctions.
COPA would be ineffective in pro-
tecting children from sexually
explicit speech because it would not
protect them from harmful material
originating outside the United
States, via protocols other than
http, or on non-commercial Web
sites. Other less-restrictive alterna-
tives than COPA include the use of
filtering software, more rigorously
enforcing existing federal obscenity
law, and enforcing three newer fed-
eral laws. These newer laws are:(1)
the Children's Internet Protection
Act, which requires the use of filter-
ing software in libraries and schools
receiving federal funds; (2) the Dot
Kids Implementation and Efficiency
Act of 2002, which protects children
from harmful materials on the
Internet by creating a special
"kids.us" domain; and (3) an
unchallenged part of COPA that
requires Internet Service Providers
to educate parents about the avail-
ability of home filtering technology.
In support of its argument that
there are other less-restrictive
means to achieve COPA's goal, the
ACLU also points out that credit
card screens already screen harmful
material that is on sale on the
Internet.
The ACLU also argues that COPA
would create a far more draconian
censorship regime for the Internet
than for other media. Many states
do not have blinder statutes, and
many others do not often or uni-
formly enforce them. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has never upheld
the constitutionality of state blinder
laws. Further, the ACLU argues that
blinder laws do not suffer from
COPA's deterrent effect on constitu-
tionally protected speech because
blinder laws do not require adults to
pay for speech they could otherwise
get for free. Nor do blinder laws
raise the privacy concerns posed by
COPA's registration requirements.
The ACLU also points out that
federal courts have struck down
seven "harmful to minors" statutes
modeled on COPA. The ACLU also
argues that the Supreme Court has
never upheld a criminal ban on
non-obscene communications
between adults.
SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court must now
weigh-in for the second time in this
more than 5-year-old court battle
over whether COPA's drafters have
rectified the constitutional defects
of the CDA. In an effort to cure the
CDA's lack of narrow tailoring, the
drafters of COPA have more narrow-
ly defined the speech that is being
regulated and have also narrowed
the speakers who are subject to reg-
ulation. However, COPA's drafters
have not really changed the CDA's
requirements for the technological
screening mechanisms that speakers
must implement to defend them-
selves against prosecution. Even
though the Court is now considering
the appropriateness of a preliminary
injunction to restrain enforcement
of COPA, its ruling may effectively
and finally determine whether
COPA is facially unconstitutional.
The CDA's fate was determined at a
similar procedural stage.
The Court's ruling is thus likely to
have a significant impact on the
long-running debate over how to
protect children from sexually
explicit materials on the Internet
that do not qualify as obscene. Few
would dispute that children can now
easily access such materials on the
Web, and concern over this is wide-
spread. But there remains signifi-
cant disagreement over who should
bear the cost and burden of imple-
menting screening, blocking and/or
filtering technologies to restrict
access by minors to harmful materi-
als. If the government prevails and
COPA is found constitutional, Web
content providers will bear this bur-
den, whereas a ruling striking down
COPA would mean that this burden
would rest on parents.
A parent's right to control what his
or her child reads or views on the
Internet is an aspect of a parent's
more general right to bring up, edu-
cate, and direct that child, a right
that the Court has protected from
state interference under the
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923), Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925). The Court has
also characterized this parental
right as a responsibility, holding
that it can therefore be constitu-
tionally permissible for lawmakers
to supplement parental control over
their children by enacting restric-
tions on children's access to harmful
speech. See, e.g., Ginsburg, 390
U.S. 639 (stating that "[t]he legisla-
ture could properly conclude that
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parents and others, teachers for
example, who have this primary
responsibility for children's well-
being are entitled to the support of
laws designed to aid discharge of
that responsibility").
However, the Court has emphasized
the importance of ensuring that par-
ents retain the right to determine
what material is appropriate for
their children. In Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 865, the Court struck down the
CDA in part because "neither the
parents' consent-nor even their
participation-in the communica-
tion would avoid the application of
the statute." COPA's drafters sought
to clarify that parents would not vio-
late COPA if they permitted their
minor children to use the family
computer to view material covered
by the Act. Although the ACLU does
not object to COPA on the basis that
it applies to a parent who consents
to his or her child accessing sexually
explicit material on the Internet, the
Court's ruling is likely to be an
important decision on the proper
role of the government in supple-
menting parental responsibility for a
child's upbringing and direction.
In determining the extent to which
the government should step in to
augment parental responsibility, the
Court must consider the proper role
of a significant non-legal source of
regulation for cyberspace: technolo-
gy in the form of hardware or soft-
ware code. As Lawrence Lessig has
famously stated in his groundbreak-
ing book on cyberlaw, Code and
Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999),
"code is law." (Code at 89). Both
the government and the ACLU con-
tend that technology has an impor-
tant role in protecting children from
harmful materials on the Internet.
The government supports COPA's
requirement that Web site owners
must implement technological filters
to block or screen minors' access to
harmful material. Although the
ACLU believes that requiring Web
site owners to implement such tech-
nology places an unacceptable bur-
den on speech that is constitutional-
ly protected for adults, the ACLU
contends that parental use of filter-
ing or blocking technology is a less
restrictive means of protecting chil-
dren from such material. A ruling in
this case is likely to be a significant
statement on the proper balance
between legal and technological reg-
ulation of cyberspace. The Court
must assess this balance in an era of
rapidly evolving technology. As the
district court noted, both sides
apparently concede that filtering,
blocking, and screening technology
is currently imperfect; the Court's
upcoming ruling in this case will
likely have an impact on the future
market for and development of this
kind of technology.
Many commentators view the bal-
ance between legal and technologi-
cal regulation of the Internet to be a
central problem that will affect its
future. It has been the subject of a
long-running debate between advo-
cates of a cyberlibertarian approach
to Internet regulation, who argue
that regulation is best left to the
market to develop appropriate
technologies of regulation, and
supporters of state regulation, who
contend that a market left entirely
to its own devices will fail and there
is thus a need for state regulation.
A ruling for the ACLU would be a
victory for the cyberlibertarian
approach to Internet regulation,
whereas a ruling for the government
would constitute a victory for
proponents of greater government
regulation of cyberspace.
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Burdens/Standards of Proof -
As a general matter, the party in a
lawsuit asserting a claim or defense
has the burden of presenting evi-
dence that establishes the claim or
defense. This is known as the
burden of proof.
There are three burdens of
proof. From the least to the most
demanding, they are the prepon-
derance-of-the-evidence burden of
proof; the clear-and-convincing
burden of proof; and the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt burden of proof.
The first two burdens can apply in
either criminal or civil cases, while
the third applies only in criminal
cases and then only to the
prosecution.
There are no ready definitions
for these burdens. There are, how-
ever, working definitions. Under
the preponderance standard, the
party with the burden of proof is
required to come forward with
credible evidence establishing that
a claim or defense is more likely
true than not. Under the clear-and-
convincing standard, the party
with the burden of proof is expect-
ed to present evidence establishing
that the claim or defense is quite
likely true. Under the beyond-a-
reasonable doubt standard, the
prosecution must present such
evidence of the defendant's guilt
that a reasonable person would
not hesitate to find the defendant
guilty. See Victor v. Nebraska,
114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994).
Class Action Lawsuit - As a gen-
eral rule, a class action lawsuit is
one in which one or several named
individuals sue for themselves and
others believed to have sustained
injuries or losses similar to those
sustained by the named plaintiffs,
but who, at the time the case is
filed, are unknown both as to their
identities and their actual num-
bers. In order for a plaintiffs law-
suit to be given class action status,
the named plaintiff must show that
(1) the class is so large as to make
it impracticable to specify each
and every plaintiff by name,
(2) there exist questions of law or
fact common to all members of the
plaintiff class, (3) the claims of the
named plaintiffs are representative
of the claims of the unnamed
plaintiffs, and (4) the named plain-
tiffs can fairly and adequately rep-
resent the interests of the entire
plaintiff class. (Note: Less common
is the class action lawsuit in which
the class is composed of named
and unnamed defendants or in
which both the plaintiffs and
the defendant's side of the ease
constitute a class.)
Collateral review (see also habeas
corpus) - Collateral review is the
criminal law's fail-safe mechanism.
It is intended to ensure that a con-
viction and sentence satisfy the
requirements imposed by law,
constitutional and statutory. As its
name suggests, collateral review
looks at a convicted defendant's tri-
al and in some cases the sentenc-
ing proceeding; it is not, however,
a second trial. As a general rule,
collateral review is limited to
issues of law.
To be eligible for collateral
review, the petitioning party must
be in custody at the time the
process begins. Typically but not
necessarily, custody means impris-
onment. For those convicted of
state-law crimes, collateral review
is available under state law and fed-
eral law, the latter in the form of a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
As a general rule, state-law peti-
tioners must exhaust all avenues of
collateral review under state law
before filing a federal habeas
corpus petition. For federal-law
petitioners, federal habeas corpus
review is available after certain
post-conviction avenues such as a
motion to vacate a conviction or
sentence have been exhausted.
For both state-law and federal-
law petitioners, federal habeas cor-
pus review begins in a trial-level
court but in the collateral-review
context, the trial court functions as
a reviewing court. However, if the
federal habeas corpus petitioner is
unsuccessful in habeas court, he or
she is permitted, within limiting
procedural rules, to seek further
review of the habeas court's
decision in the appropriate inter-
mediate federal appeals court and
if unsuccessful there, in the
Supreme Court.
Damages - In law, damages means
money given to a party whose legal
interests have been injured. While
there are several types of damages
that can be given to an injured par-
ty, two of the most prominent
types are compensatory damages
and punitive damages.
An award of compensatory
damages is a sum of money
intended to make the injured party
whole, insofar as this is possible.
An award of punitive damages is
intended to punish the wrongdoer
in order to deter future wrongdoing.
Usually, punitive damages go to the
injured party and are over and
above any award of compensatory
damages. However, in some states,
a portion of any punitive damages
award goes to the state treasury.
Direct review - In American crim-
inal law, a defendant is tried once,
but the trial itself can be reviewed
many times by many appellate
courts. One channel of review is
called direct review because it is
initiated by a first appeal as a mat-
ter of statutory right. Direct review
also is wide-ranging review because
the convicted defendant is permit-
ted to raise all procedurally proper
issues regarding the trial court's
disposition of his or her case -
including issues of law, issues of
fact, issues concerning the trial
judge's use of discretion.
If the first appeal is resolved
against the convicted defendant,
appellate rules permit the defen-
dant to seek discretionary review
by still higher courts, generally by
the highest court of the convicting
state and then by the United States
Supreme Court. (In federal crimi-
nal cases, the convicted defendant's
initial appeal as a matter of right is
to a circuit court of appeals and
then as a matter of discretion to
the Supreme Court.) If these courts
decline to hear the defendant's
ease, hear the case but decide
against the defendant, or if the
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defendant defaults on his or her
right to seek discretionary review,
the direct review process ends and
it is said that the defendant's con-
viction and sentence are final. At
this point, the only avenue of relief
from a conviction or sentence -
retrial, resentencing, or outright
release - is collateral review
defined above.
Discovery - Discovery is a
pretrial device in which each party
to a lawsuit seeks information from
the other party as well as from non-
parties believed to have knowledge
relevant to the issues in the case.
The plaintiff seeks information
through discovery to make his or
her case; the defendant seeks
information to support any
defenses that may be available.
Diversity - This term is used
whenever a federal court has juris-
diction over a case that does not
involve a question of federal law.
While there are several types of
diversity jurisdiction, the most
common type has two require-
ments: (1) the plaintiff and the
)defendant are residents of different
states; (2) the dollar amount of the
dispute between the parties is at
least $75,000, exclusive of interest
and costs.
Habeas corpus - Under the feder-
al habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C.
§2254 (1994), a person held in
state/local custody who believes
that his or her custody violates
federal law - typically, the
Constitution - may challenge that
custody by filing a petition for a
writ (i.e., an order) of habeas cor-
pus in federal district court. If the
petitioner wins, he or she must be
released or retried, at the option of
the prosecuting authority.
In bane - In bane (sometimes
spelled en bane) literally means
"full bench." The term applies to
those courts - typically, interme-
diate appellate courts - in which
more than one judge, but less than
all judges of the court, hears a
lease. As a general rule, when an
appellate court sits in bane, all
American Bar Association
active judges sit. However, in the
federal system, some circuit courts
of appeals have so many active
judges, e.g., the Ninth Circuit
with 28 judges, that sitting literally
in bane is not feasible. Thus, for
those circuits with 15 or more
active judges, the size of an in
bane court is set by circuit rule.
Currently, in bane courts in the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits are composed of fewer
than the entire court, with the
exact number varying by circuit
according to circuit rule.
Per curiam opinion - This term
literally means "the opinion of the
court," the Supreme Court or any
appellate court. Because the opinion
is the court's opinion, there is no
indication of which justice/judge
wrote it.
Plurality opinion - This term
denotes an opinion of the United
States Supreme Court in which
there is no majority opinion; that
is, fewer than a bare majority of
five justices were able to agree on
the legal basis for the Court's
action in affirming, reversing, or
vacating a lower court decision.
In some cases, the Court's
opinion can be a partial plurality
opinion. A partial plurality opinion
is one in which at least one part
of the opinion represents the views
of four or fewer Justices. For an
example of a partial plurality opin-
ion, see Hubbard v. United States,
115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995) (Parts IV
and V, a plurality of three Justices;
Parts I, II, III, and VI, a majority of
six Justices).
Preemption - Under the
Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art.
VI, § 2, federal law - whether
based on the Constitution, a
statute, or a treaty - takes prece-
dence over state or local law on the
same matter. In other words, if
federal law addresses a matter,
either expressly or by implication,
it trumps and renders unenforce-
able any state or local law on the
matter.
Qualified Immunity Q- ualified
immunity is a defense that can be
raised by a government employee
whenever there is uncertainty
about the lawfulness or unlawful-
ness of certain actions taken by the
employee, actions claimed by the
plaintiff to be unlawful. A govern-
ment employee can avoid a trial
under this defense if the employee
can show that, at the time of the
complained-of action, he or she
could not have known that it
violated the law.
Strict scrutiny - Strict scrutiny is
a searching level of judicial review
applied to governmental actions
- federal, state, and local -
challenged as unconstitutional.
Strict scrutiny requires the
governmental actor to show that
it had a compelling reason to
take the challenged action and that
the action taken goes no further
than necessary - is narrowly
tailored - to advance the cited
compelling reason.
Summary judgment - This is the
name of a procedural device avail-
able to either party to a civil lawsuit
that enables one or the other party
to win without a trial. A party seek-
ing summary judgment is entitled to
a judgment in its favor if there is no
genuine dispute about the pertinent
facts, and, based on those undisput-
ed facts, the law compels a judgment
for the party who has asked for a
favorable ruling.
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COVERING THE COURT'S ENTIRE MARCH
CALENDAR OF CASES, INCLUDING ...
ELK GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT V. NEWDOW ET AL.
Michael Newdow, the respondent in this case, is an atheist
and the father of a minor child who attends a public elementary
school in the Elk Grove District. He objects to his child hearing
and observing the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.
In June 2002, a divided three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit
ruled that the phrase "under God" in the Pledge violates
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
In February 2003, the panel issued an amended opinion
that retreated slightly from its holding that the words "under God"
in the Pledge are unconstitutional but reaffirmed that a
public school district's policy of requiring teachers to lead willing
students in reciting the Pledge is unconstitutional.
HIIBEL V. SIXTH JUDICLU DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF NEVADA ET AL.
The issue in this case arose when a police officer responding
to a citizen's call regarding a possible assault encountered
a potential suspect who refused to identify himself.
The question pressed by the petitioner is whether
the government can force an individual to identify himself
if the police have legitimately detained him but lack
probable cause to make an arrest. Specifically,
the Court is being asked to decide whether a state law
that requires detained individuals to identify themselves
violates either the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination or the Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.
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